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In a key passage in the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the A-edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant poses the question:  
What does one mean ... if one speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also 
distinct from the cognition? (A104)  
One would think that it is obvious to suppose that the object of which we claim 
knowledge, which corresponds to it, exists independently and regardless of that claim. The 
being of the object does not depend on our knowledge and must therefore be strictly 
distinguished from it. But Kant’s question goes beyond distinguishing between the 
necessary conditions under which we can claim knowledge of an object and the ostensibly 
quite separate question concerning the constitutive or ontological conditions for the 
independent existence of the object. This distinction reﬂects the traditional distinction 
between an epistemological question, which concerns knowledge, and a metaphysical 
question, which concerns the being or existence of things. Kant asks a more fundamental 
question: What do we actually mean by ‘object’? This question goes beyond both a purely 
metaphysical and a purely epistemological question, because it is precisely about 
determining what we mean by the notion ‘object’ before we can even formulate any speciﬁc 
knowledge claims about an arbitrary object and assess their truth conditions. In his 
analysis in the Deduction, Kant wants to make visible something more formal that would 
remain implicit if we were to take the object too concretely, as merely an empirically given 
thing that presents itself to us. If we were to consider the object merely as an empirically 
given thing we would never be able to gather more than random information about it. This 
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formal aspect concerns the way in which we relate to an object at all. To make this element 
visible, we must take a certain reﬂective distance from the concrete object we experience. 
The concept of ‘object’ itself already expresses a certain reﬂexiveness, as Kant suggests (cf. 
A103–4). In his analysis in the Deduction Kant brings this reﬂexive element forward, in 
order to be able to elucidate what it actually means to talk about an object and, in a more 
concrete sense, in fact ﬁrst to be able to have experience of it and make judgements about 
it. 
 What is revealed in such a formal analysis is what Kant understands by the so-
called transcendental conditions of possibility for both the experience of an object and the 
object of experience, namely the conditions that govern the domain of possible experience. 
He links this to the possibility of synthetic a priori judgements, judgements that are 
neither purely analytical, and whose truth can be deduced from the analysis of the 
concepts contained therein, nor a posteriori empirical judgements. These synthetic a priori 
judgements are not concrete judgements in the usual sense of the word, but express the 
fundamental principles that make it possible to speak of an object of experience in the ﬁrst 
place, to judge about it—principles that play in the background of our ordinary 
judgements of experience: these synthetic a priori judgements declare that under certain 
rules that Kant names categories objects can be known as objects, and at the same time 
these categories are constitutive of the object itself, qua object. Kant writes at the 
beginning of the Analytic of Principles: 
In this way synthetic a priori judgments are possible, if we relate the formal 
conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of imagination, and its necessary unity 
in a transcendental apperception to a possible cognition of experience in general, and 
say: The conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same 
time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience, and on this 
account have objective validity in a synthetic judgment a priori. (CPR, B197/A158) 
To return to the above-cited passage from the A-Deduction, Kant answers the question as 
follows: 
It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in general = 
X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this 
cognition as corresponding to it. (CPR, A104) 
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Kant denies here that the object of which we claim knowledge is given outside of our 
cognition. Instead, the object of knowledge is only ‘something in general = X’. In a sense, 
the object of knowledge is internalised in thought, that is, a function of thought. In the 
following passage, Kant indeed repeats that we are only dealing with our representations 
and that the ‘X which corresponds to them (the object)—because it [the object] is 
something that should be distinct from our representations—is nothing for us [and] the 
unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the 
consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations’ (CPR, A105, 
translation emended). He continues: ‘Hence we say that we cognize the object if we have 
eﬀected synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition.’ The questions that arise are ‘What is 
correspondence?’, ‘How is distinction taken account of?’ and to what extent does a 
correspondence theory of truth still play a role in Kant? I cannot deal with these questions 
here, but it seems clear that for Kant correspondence between representation and object 
should not be understood as a relation of some sort between an absolutely inner self and 
an absolutely externally given object.  
 The claim that an object is when we have eﬀected a unity among our 
representations does not mean to say, however, that the thing that we know something 
objective about is also ‘generated’ by our thinking, by the unity of consciousness, in terms 
of its existence. The thing that, insofar as it is an object of experience, is as an object for 
the knower and is ‘something in general = X’, is itself, qua existing in itself, of course not 
internalised. As is well-known, Kant makes a distinction between the appearance of a thing 
and the thing in itself. It is the appearance of a thing that Kant identiﬁes with the object of 
knowledge. We can know only the appearance of a thing, and not the thing in itself, which 
remains independent of the knowing subject (I shall come back to this distinction later on). 
Objects are therefore in some very speciﬁc sense distinct(at least conceptually, if not 
numerically) from things in themselves. The traditional conception of true knowledge is 
that our true judgements about things actually correspond to the things that are 
independent of our judgements, therefore have an itself-nature independently and 
regardless of our judgements (which is expressed in the correspondence theory of truth). 
How else could our judgements be true of things if they did not correspond to the things as 
they are in themselves? 
 However, Kant is not interested in the question of truth per se, that is to say, the 
standard question of the logical conditions under which a certain judgement a is F is true 
or false, or what the truth value of our judgements is, nor in the question about which 
other necessary but non-logical conditions must be met so that a certain judgement is true. 
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He is rather interested in a deeper aspect of the relation between judgement and the object 
of judgement, whereby judgement should be interpreted here as a synthetic judgement.  He 1
therefore speaks of the question of transcendental truth. What makes it possible for me to 
attribute, truly or falsely, a predicate a to an underlying object, the ‘X’ that Kant speaks 
of in the above-quoted passage in A104 (and by means of a also another predicate F, G, 
etc.)? What is at issue here is the primordial relation to the object as such in any arbitrary 
judgement about an arbitrary given object or objective event, namely the original 
orientation to the object or object-directedness—regardless of the question whether 
attributing any arbitrary predicates a and F to any object leads to a true or false 
judgement about same object. This deeper relation to the object, which is indicated by the 
adjective ‘transcendental’, expresses the objective validity of an arbitrary empirical 
judgement about a given object. Objective validity is the fundamental ground that enables 
us ﬁrst to make a (true or false) judgement about a given object at all. For Kant, 
therefore, objective validity is the characteristic of judgement as such.  2
 But what exactly is it that determines objective validity? How does objective 
validity come about if it does not lie in the correspondence per se between, on the one 
hand, judgement or our understanding, and, on the other hand, the thing that is to be 
distinguished from it and that has an independent existence in itself, let alone that the 
object or thing itself is the so-called truthmaker? And does the uncoupling of objective 
validity as the fundamental orientation to the object from the traditionally conceived 
correspondence relation between intellect and thing not precisely lead to a gap between our 
conceptuality and reality? Does Kant’s approach to the question of truth as representation-
internal not run the risk of a hopeless idealism, whereby we are locked into our own ideas 
and our own mental ‘reality’? In other words, does there not exist the risk of an 
epistemological relativism, where only our own ideas and judgements are objective, and the 
‘really real’ cannot be reached? 
 In my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental 
Deduction (Palgrave Macmillan 2017), against the background of current discussions in 
 With analytic judgements the relation to an object, an underlying x, is otiose because irrelevant 1
for assessing whether the judgement is true or false.  
 Kant provides the deﬁnition for judgement in CPR, B142; there he explicitly connects objective 2
validity with the nature of judgement. But it should be noted that this concerns determinative 
judgements, not non-determinative, merely-reﬂective judgements, such as aesthetic judgements, of 
which Kant speaks in the third Critique, nor analytic judgements, for which reference to an 
underlying object is irrelevant. 
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contemporary analytical Kant research, I argue that Kant is a radical subjectivist in the 
sense that the objective application rules for our concepts are purely a function of the 
capacity to judge, given the fact that we are sensory beings who receive impressions from 
the outside, from the things themselves. Our sensibility is of course a necessary condition 
of possible empirical knowledge of objects, but sensibility is not determinative in the sense 
Kant means; only our capacity to judge determines what knowledge and an object of 
knowledge is. The radical-subjective lies, more speciﬁcally, in the fact that our capacity to 
judge is deﬁned by what Kant calls transcendental apperception. Apperception is the 
principle of self-awareness and makes it possible for me to be aware of myself as the person 
who has certain representations. But apperception is not merely the principle of self-
awareness, as if this should be seen in contrast to the consciousness of objects. The radical 
claim that Kant makes—and which I explain in my books in detail—is the claim that the 
act of transcendental apperception, which is an act of the synthesis of all my 
representations, does not concern a random series of representations that I have (more 
accurately, which are occurrent in the mind), but establishes the objective unity among 
those representations that I regard as mine. The rules for a priori synthesis that enable 
such an objective unity among my representations are the categories. The categories are 
the various, very general modes—twelve to be exact—in which that unity among my 
representations obtains, in such a way that these representations are identical to each other 
insofar as they count as all my representations qua combined, namely those representations 
that I apprehend as mine. Kant calls this unity the original synthetic unity of 
apperception, which is the unity of the thinking subject that takes a series of 
representations together as his own. Kant speaks of this act of apperception as an act of 
accompanying by the ‘I think’. The unity of the act of apperception is the original ground 
of unity among representations that are accompanied by this ‘I think’. 
 The identity of this thinking subject, the I of the ‘I think’ that unites its 
representations, is at the same time the identity of the whole of uniﬁed representations 
accompanied by the same subject. This uniﬁed whole of representations forms a something, 
an object in general, for that subject. What is termed ‘object’ thus lies in the way in which 
the thinking subject takes his representations as an identical whole that is as an object for 
that same subject. That is why Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception an 
objective unity of apperception, and why he deﬁnes object as ‘that in the concept of which 
the manifold of a given intuition is united’ (B137): the unity of apperception maps exactly 
onto the unity of the manifold in the intuition. There is an element of necessity or 
invariance in the act of apperception that is not already contained in the ﬂow of the 
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separate representations as such (cf. A107). This element ensures that the representations 
are not merely subjectively valid representations of an arbitrary representer. Because it is a 
necessary connection between representations, the objective unity of apperception, which 
expresses the unity of the twelve categories of experience, is always the unity of a thinking 
subject’s judgement, and that has the basic character of a is F—in contrast to a 
contingent sequence of variant, separate representations that any representer might have. 
For Kant, the thinking subject is always the judging, cognising, self-conscious subject. The 
objective unity of apperception is therefore the deﬁnition of  judgement, and expresses the 
unity of the predicates a and F in relation to the underlying object that the judgement a is 
F is about. In short, the objective unity of apperception in a judgement in fact deﬁnes 
what an object is, qua that in which predicates a and F are united. This expresses the 
fundamental, intimate identity relation between thought and object, between judgement 
and object, without there having to be an inexplicable relation that is external to an object 
outside of its representation. 
 But how can an identity relation between thought and object in a judgement 
establish the relation to a real empirical object? Kant makes a fundamental distinction 
between the intuition of an object, which expresses the immediate relationship to the given 
object, and the concept which relates to the object only by means of such a intuition. But 
as we have seen, in Kant’s view, the relation to the object is representation-internal; the 
object is nothing outside of our knowledge to which that knowledge should correspond. Yet 
the objective unity of apperception is the condition of possibility only for the object qua 
object, that is, it constitutes its objectivity. It does not constitute the object with respect 
to its existence (cf. A92/B125). That would in fact be impossible, because it would mean 
that thinking would generate the reality of an object in an existential or factual sense. The 
condition of real possibility for knowledge, that what makes knowledge true empirical 
knowledge, experience, (B147), lies in sensibility, because only empirical intuition provides 
a direct sensory relation to the really existing object. 
 On the other hand, the intuition itself is also only a representation, or a bundle of 
representations (sensory impressions), which, although having a direct relation to the real 
thing of which we have a representation (the x of a judgement), are not identical to that 
thing. We must diﬀerentiate between, on the one hand, the distinction between 
representation and represented and, on the other hand, the distinction between 
representation/represented and the thing in itself, namely the thing with all its possible 
predicates (in a judgement we can attribute only a limited amount thereof to the thing 
judged about). Kant’s Copernican turn—which states that in order to analyse the 
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possibility of knowledge we no longer take the correspondence relation to be directed from 
mind to thing, but instead must take things as they conform to us, to our forms of 
knowledge—applies both to the intuition, the form of our sensibility, and to the concept, 
the form with which our minds work. Although the intuition thus establishes the 
immediate, as yet indeterminate relation to the real existing thing, the determined relation 
remains representation-internal. 
 Here it is important to see that transcendental apperception works both ways: it 
establishes unity among concepts, on the one hand, and among representations in intuition, 
on the other, and this happens simultaneously in judgement in virtue of one and the same 
determining act of synthesis (the act of apperception) that is performed by the judging 
agent, for example in the judgement This armchair is Prussian-blue-coloured. The 
predicates this armchair and Prussian-blue-coloured are connected in this judgement by the 
‘Verhältniswörtchen’—as Kant calls it—‘is’. But the copula ‘is’ says more than just that 
predicates are linked to each other. For a judgement always also has a modal element; it is 
not just a proposition. The copula says something about the existence of the object about 
which a judgement is made. The predicates this armchair and Prussian-blue-coloured are 
also connected with an intuition of a particular existing thing that falls under the subject 
concept which, just in case the judgement is true, has the characteristics of being an 
armchair and being Prussian-blue-coloured. In the judgement I thus perceive the existing 
thing as the object with the objective properties that I attribute to it in the judgement. 
That object is, of course, from a purely empirical point of view the thing that exists 
independently and regardless of the judgement. But the object qua object, or qua the 
determined thing with such and such properties, is purely a function of judgement. 
 As we have seen, what is characteristic of Kant’s position is that our knowledge 
does not consist in a direct correspondence relation between concepts/intuition and thing. 
Whereas it is true that in Kant’s view empirically speaking a thing existing independently 
of the perceiving subject is presupposed as given—contrary to what many commentators 
think, Kant is not concerned with proving that such things or objects exist de re; he just 
takes that for granted—from a transcendental point of view there is nothing beyond the 
judgement, that is to say, beyond the relation between concepts and the underlying 
intuition to which the judgement corresponds that determines the truth of my cognition. 
The objective validity of a judgement about a given object is established only in virtue of 
the objective unity of apperception that connects concepts and intuition in a judgement 
about a given object; as Kant says, ‘we say that we cognize the object if we have eﬀected 
synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition’ (A105), conﬁrming that the unity  of 
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apperception deﬁnes the object in the way that we know it. This is the thesis that I have 
called Kant’s radical subjectivism, referring to what Kant himself says, in the A-
Deduction, where he speaks about nature as a ‘whole of appearances’ (Inbegriﬀ von 
Erscheinungen), namely all possible objects of experience that can be found only ‘in the 
radical faculty [dem Radikalvermögen] of all our cognition, namely, transcendental 
apperception’, in ‘that unity on account of which alone it can be called object of all 
possible experience, i.e., nature’ (A114). 
 The objective validity of an arbitrary judgement about an empirical object is wholly 
constituted by the determining power of the judging, apperceiving subject that apprehends 
and synthesises his representations. This applies not only to the concepts in the judgement 
but also to the sensory representations in the underlying intuition. The same subject that 
combines the predicates this armchair and Prussian-blue-coloured at the same time 
combines the sensory perceptions of a particular thing, the armchair, to which these 
predicates are attributed in the judgement. Kant expresses this in such a way that the 
synthesis of the intuition must be seen as ‘the transcendental synthesis of the imagination’, 
whose faculty ‘is an eﬀect of the understanding on sensibility and its ﬁrst application [...] 
to objects of the intuition that is possible for us’ (B152)—so the understanding itself, that 
is to say, the thinking subject that apperceives his representations, has, ‘under the 
designation [unter der Benennung] of a transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination’ (B153), an eﬀect on sensibility, and thus it acts as a synthesis of the 
apprehension of representations in sensible intuition itself. In this way the identity relation 
between thought and object manifests itself as a relation that refers to an empirically 
perceived object, without it having to go beyond our representations. 
 It should be emphasised that what is, as it were, generated here by the judging 
subject is only the necessary form of the empirical judgement, namely the synthetic unity 
that combines both the concepts and the empirical intuitions—not the content of the 
judgement, namely the predicates themselves (in this case this armchair and Prussian-
blue-coloured) and the sensory material as such that underlies the judgement and provides 
it real possibility; these are contingent and dependent on all sorts of non-transcendental 
conditions.  The form of judgement—the objective unity of apperception—is necessary in 3
 This should not be misunderstood as suggesting that the sensible material is not also determined 3
in terms of its intensive magnitude, by the understanding, in judgement. But this still concerns the 
form of matter, i.e. matter qua matter, which is being determined as the necessary element of all 
objective knowledge, not the factuality or the characteristics of this or that particular sense 
impression, or this or that particular conceptual trait. 
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the sense that it is the necessary transcendental condition for the essential nature of a 
judgement as an objectively valid statement about an object or objective event. But it is 
also the suﬀicient condition for objective validity, because the object is, in terms of its 
objectivity, a function of that form; or more precisely, the form, namely the objective unity 
of apperception, deﬁnes the object. Transcendental-logically speaking, the object does not 
exist outside the judgement, outside apperception. This is what is radically subjective 
about Kant’s position. 
 However, that does not mean, again, that the object depends on the judgement for 
its actual existence. As I indicated earlier, Kant makes a distinction between appearances 
and things in themselves. Appearances are things insofar as we can know them as an 
object of our knowledge, of our judgements. An appearance is, as Kant says, the 
indeterminate object of a sensible intuition (the ‘x’ which I mentioned earlier), and is 
identical to the object as a function of judgement insofar as that appearance is determined 
by the categories (also ‘existence’ is of course a category, but here a distinction must be 
made between the fact that something exists and establishing, in a judgement, in virtue of 
applying the category ‘existence’, that something exists). 
 Kant’s radical subjectivism thus implies an idealism with respect to the object as 
being in some sense dependent on our judging, but this is not the idealism of Berkeley, say, 
which denies the mind-independent existence of things in themselves. Kant’s radical 
subjectivism ensures that we can explain the intimate correspondence between knowledge 
and object as a function of our own capacity to judge, namely the objective unity of 
apperception, and that at the same time things insofar as their existence is concerned are 
not reduced to being a function of our representations. Whereas Kant’s subjectivism is 
thus characterised by both a metaphysical and epistemological component—metaphysical 
because not only the knowledge or experience of an object but also the known object itself 
is a function of transcendental apperception—the thing in itself retains its existential 
independence. This in no way implies that our knowledge of objective reality is only 
relative because supposedly it would not reach the things in themselves—an oft-heard 
criticism, especially from Hegelians reading Kant.  Such a conclusion ignores the fact that 4
the object determined by the judging subject is the appearance of the thing itself, for that 
judging subject. Although the judging subject does not know the thing as such, namely 
independently of judgement, i.e. in itself, he does know the thing in the way in which it 
 See my critique of Sally Sedgwick’s position in my review of her book Hegel’s Critique of Kant 4
(OUP 2012) (Schulting 2016). See also Schulting (2017), ch. 8.
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appears to him as an object. The fact that he does not know the thing as a thing in itself 
follows logically from the fact that knowledge of something is not possible apart from the 
necessary conditions under which such knowledge is ﬁrst possible: For how can I judge of 
something that it is so and so independently of judgement? Things are therefore knowable 
if and only if they are subject to the necessary conditions for knowledge, and they are 
subject to those conditions only if and when they appear to us qua objects, not as things 
in themselves. 
 Knowledge of objects is thus possible only if the necessary a priori conditions for 
knowledge of objects are met; outside of those necessary a priori conditions knowledge is ex 
hypothesi not possible, nor are objects of knowledge, that is, objects for us, possible 
outside of those conditions. This means that things in themselves, that is, things as they 
are independently of the conditions under which alone they (as objects) can be known, 
cannot be known as such (as things in themselves) under the conditions under which alone 
objects can be known.  Or, as Kant says in the foreword to the B-edition of the Critique, 5
‘we can cognize of things a priori only what we ourselves have put into them’ (Bxviii). 
This Copernican principle ensures that things in themselves retain their absolute 
independence. Does this mean that Kant’s theory of knowledge is relativist? Not at all. 
Such a question betrays a misunderstanding with regard to the transcendental question of 
how knowledge of an object is possible at all, how object is deﬁned, and what it means to 
make a judgement about an object.
 Of course, I can form a notion of the necessary characteristics of a thing in itself and make a 5
synthetic a priori judgement about it—e.g. that a thing in itself cannot be spatiotemporal. Such a 
judgement, however, does not relate to an actual particular object, that is, the x of an empirical 
intuition that underlies the subject-concept of a synthetic a posteriori judgement. It does not yield 
knowledge in the sense of the claims made in the Deduction. Further, such a judgement would still 
be bound by the constraints of transcendental apperception, under which an object in general can 
be thought, and so does not reach things in themselves as such (but just explains the concept of 
them). See Schulting (2017), ch. 9.
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